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I. INTRODUCTION
The current pension taxation rules give employers almost sole
discretion in determining whether employees will have substantial tax-
favored retirement savings options. This power has resulted in the
majority of employees in small businesses having no coverage under
qualified retirement plans.' Giving employers the power to implement
qualified retirement programs also resulted in retirement benefit
coverage for some employees who would prefer that their plan
contributions be paid as direct compensation, yielding them more
immediate benefit.2 Because only employers can sponsor most types of
tax-favored retirement plans, many employees who desire substantial
retirement savings cannot tax-effectively achieve their goals. Ironically,
many other employees automatically accumulate retirement savings,
irrespective of their current needs or desires. A rigid system that serves
the needs of few, while complicating the lives of many, causes this
inefficient situation.
Tax-favored individual retirement accounts permit earners to make
direct annual contributions not in excess of $2000, which is an
exception to the general policy of employer control in the retirement
Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law; A.B., 1970, Oberlin College;
J.D., 1974, Harvard Law School.
I. In a speech before the San Francisco Actuarial Club on July 17, 1998, David M. Strauss,
Executive Director of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, mentioned that 50 million
Americans have no coverage under any employer-sponsored retirement plan, and that only eight
percent of lower-wage workers, and just 20% of small business workers, have any retirement
plan. See I Qualified Plan Alert No. 7, October 1998 (Panel Publishers). A tax favored, or
"qualified" retirement plan, "is a definite written program and arrangement which is communi-
cated to the employees and which is established and maintained by an employer .... " Treas.
Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1976).
2. Frequently, younger employees with children fall into this category of workers.
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savings arena.3 The greater potential for tax-favored retirement savings,
however, resides in employer-sponsored plans. These plans, at their
best, provide some employees with retirement distributions for life well
in excess of $100,000 per year.4  The economic consequences of
employer-sponsored retirement plans tend to attract business owners
and other key personnel who strongly desire simultaneous tax relief and
retirement income security. Despite this initial attraction, many
employers decline to sponsor any retirement plans because of
significant costs and technical complexities. When an employer does
choose to sponsor a plan, the employer may take advantage of
numerous rules in the pension taxation scheme that restrict coverage
and contributions for common employees while allowing highly
compensated participants to accrue substantial benefits.5
The owners of closely held businesses need not look solely to
qualified retirement arrangements to provide themselves with tax-
favored retirement savings. They can avoid the complexities, costs, and
restrictions on economic freedom associated with formal pension
arrangements while providing amply for their own retirement needs. 6
The federal income taxation rules that govern the formation, growth,
and disposition of business interests efficiently permit the owner of a
closely held business to use the enterprise itself as a repository of value
for future retirement needs. Consequently, many employees of small
3. See I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) (1994). The $2000 annual contribution limit for individual retire-
ment accounts appears paltry in comparison with the contribution limit of the lesser of $30,000
per year or 25% of compensation permitted for qualified defined contribution plans sponsored by
employers. See 1.R.C. § 415(c)(1) (1994) (setting a different limit where employers sponsor re-
tirement plans).
4. The $30,000 per year limit of section 415(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code does not in-
clude earnings credited to the trust fund, which can boost total savings to millions of dollars and
provide retirement payments that actually exceed an employee's annual earnings while employed.
See I.R.C. § 415(c)(2) (1994); see also I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (1994) (regarding accrued benefit limi-
tations for qualified defined benefit plans).
5. For example, a sponsoring employer can prevent large numbers of employees from partici-
pating in a qualified retirement plan by taking advantage of various participation exclusions per-
mitted under I.R.C. § 410(a) & (b). See I.R.C. § 410(a)-(b) (1994). One important exclusion al-
lows an employer to automatically deny plan access to part-time employees who work fewer than
1000 hours per year. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(3)(A) (1994).
6. Once an employer has excluded as many employees as it can under the participation cover-
age rules, the employer must cover the balance of its workforce or face plan disqualification. See
I.R.C. § 410 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Thus, the criteria for assigning qualified, deferred com-
pensation result from the Internal Revenue Code's technical qualification features and do not de-
rive solely from market conditions that might otherwise inform an employer's decisions when
compensating individual employees. The employer that adopts a qualified retirement plan sur-
renders some of its economic freedom to tax regulation. See I.R.C. § 410 (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (discussing coverage exclusions under qualified retirement plans).
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businesses have no formal retirement plan coverage partly because of
the tax-favored savings features of business ownership itself. A
comparison of the tax features of qualified retirement plans and
business ownership reveals why, despite the many types of qualified
retirement plans available to employers, so few rank and file employees
of small businesses enjoy retirement plan coverage. 7
Like qualified plans, business ownership and reinvestment offers
retirement security for owners via income recognition deferrals, tax-
sheltered value growth, and favorable taxation upon cashing out.
Unlike qualified plans, business reinvestment does not involve
compliance challenges, such as nondiscrimination and coverage rules,
borrowing restrictions, and social protection structures pertaining to
spousal rights, vesting, and spendthrift restraints. In deciding how to
spend profits, small business owners often reject qualified plans in favor
of business reinvestment, which offers them less complicated personal
retirement security. Rather than alter either the tax advantages of
business ownership or the key regulatory features of qualified plans,
Congress should enhance the personal retirement savings prerogatives
of employees through expanded opportunities to fund individual
retirement accounts without employer consent.
II. How TAXATION BENEFITS OF BUSINESS REINVESTMENT COMPARE
WITH TAXATION BENEFITS OF QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS
The favorable income taxation features of qualified retirement plans
are: immediately deductible contributions that employees do not
recognize until actual distribution; deferral of income recognition on
fund earnings; and mitigated distributions taxation. Devoting profits to
business reinvestment, however, often produces equal or improved tax
advantages.
A. Income Recognition Deferralfor the Business Owner
In each year that business operations produce an excess of gross
income over expenses, the business owner has to decide how to dispose
7. Qualified retirement arrangements include the following: defined benefit pension plans,
money purchase pension plans, target benefit pension plans, cash balance plans, profit sharing
plans, stock bonus plans, employee stock ownership plans, simplified employee pensions, and
cash or deferred plans like the well known "401(k)" savings programs that have become so
popular with larger employers. Congress recently added the Savings Incentive Match Plan
("SIMPLE" plan) to the list of employer-sponsored retirement arrangements. See Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 1421, 110 Stat. 1755, 1792-95 (codified at
I.R.C. § 408(p) (1994)).
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of the added value. 8 If the business owner provides services within the
business, compensation for these services represents an expense that
affects the availability of profits to serve noncompensatory purposes
that increase the value of the business.9 The owner of a controlling
interest in a corporation, for instance, can become an employee of the
corporation and set his salary so low that the owner's services have little
cost to the corporation, or so high that the corporation incurs operating
losses in order to allow the owner to enjoy a higher standard of living.10
Owners who either have outside sources of income or who deliberately
restrict themselves to lower standards of living have a great deal of
discretion in determining how much profit will remain with their
businesses and thus increase the enterprise's value. Converting
potential profitability into personal consumption tends to restrict the
growth of an enterprise's value, while retaining profits in the business
tends to turn the business into a steadily compounding form of personal
savings for the owner, who trades immediate consumption for an
increasing net worth. Owning a business surely tests one's tolerance for
deferred gratification. 1'
8. This added value does not necessarily comport with income taxation concepts of "gross
income." See I.R.C. § 61(a)(2) (1994). Nor does it comport with the concept of business expense
deductions. See generally I.R.C. § 162 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (outlining allowable general
business expense deductions). Taxable income is another concept that is not synonymous with
added value. See I.R.C. § 63 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). For example, economic income can in-
clude interest receipts exempt under I.R.C. § 103. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (1994) (excluding state and
local bond interest from gross income). Tax deductions may include depreciation allowances
granted under section 168 of the Internal Revenue Code even though the assets involved actually
appreciate in value. See I.R.C. § 168(a) (1994) (providing for the depreciation of tangible prop-
erty).
9. To achieve income tax deductions for compensation paid to a business owner who serves as
an employee of a business, the compensation must not exceed the vague "reasonable allowance"
standard imposed by section 162(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which sets at least a theo-
retical upper limit on the conversion of economic profits into deductible service payments. See
I.R.C. § 162 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (outlining the parameters of self-employment deduc-
tions).
10. The owner of an unincorporated business can similarly extract a variable amount of the
profits from the business for personal consumption without worrying about the extent of personal
services rendered because a sole proprietor gets no deduction for an owner-related compensatory
expense under section 162(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 162(l)(4) (1994)
(discussing health insurance deductions for self-employed individuals). The proprietor cannot
serve as both employer and employee for this purpose and can only deduct compensation paid to
others who might serve as employees of the proprietor. See id. A partnership may deduct a com-
pensatory payment for a partner's services if it designates the payment as a "guaranteed pay-
ment," even though this is a limitation of the general rule. See I.R.C. § 707(c) (1994). Other-
wise, partnership income allocated to a partner will not produce a deduction under section
162(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code and, thus, need not relate to the extent of services ren-
dered by a partner. See I.R.C. § 707(c) (1994).
11. Regular employees, especially in newer high technology firms, sometimes also are able to
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The owner of a prosperous business may also create wealth by
structuring a personal compensation package that includes contributions
to a formal retirement savings plan. 12 The business owner who sets up a
qualified retirement plan places faith in the growth potential of other
businesses, as well as faith in the business personally controlled. 13 The
entrepreneur who diverts part of the bounty of the enterprise into a
qualified retirement plan's investment portfolio makes an economic
decision that the diverted money will ultimately produce more personal
benefit than if the money went into either immediate consumption or the
enterprise's present and future needs. 14  This choice involves a cost-
benefit analysis that requires comparing the needs of tomorrow with
current business and personal demands.
The economic decision to favor current consumption, qualified
retirement savings, or business growth must take into account the tax
implications of each choice. If an owner chooses immediate
consumption, income recognition will likely result, thereby reducing
consumption to the net value remaining after income taxes are paid.' 5 If
the owner chooses to divert profits into a qualified retirement plan,
income recognition will not occur until the qualified plan's trust
actually distributes assets to the owner. 16  Deferred gratification
exercise their tolerance for deferred gratification (and risk) when their compensation packages
include substantial stock options in lieu of immediate payments.
12. "Formality" here refers primarily to the voluminous and detailed qualification scheme for
tax-favored retirement plans contained in section 401(a) of the Code. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (West
1988 & Supp. 1999).
13. Unlike investment in a personally controlled business, investment in a stock portfolio held
in a qualified retirement plan cannot exceed specific annual limitations that constitute an impor-
tant part of the qualification scheme under sections 415(b) and (c) of the Code. See I.R.C. §
415(b)(1) (1994) (setting benefits at the lesser of $90,000 or 100% of the participant's average
compensation from the last three years); I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) (1994) (setting contributions at the
lesser of $30,000 or 25% of the participant's compensation for the year).
14. In some instances, leaving profits in the business to serve future growth will not offer the
best choice because of market exigencies. For example, the particular business might already
have reached its maximum market share and face cost inefficiencies that prohibit expansion
through operational diversification.
15. The owner has some power to mitigate compensatory tax consequences that would nor-
mally occur under section 61(a)(1) of the Code by taking advantage of a variety of employee
fringe benefits that result in income exclusions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 105(b) (1994) (excluding re-
imbursements for medical expenses from gross income); I.R.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)
(excluding employer contributions to accident and health plans from gross income); I.R.C. § 119
(West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (excluding the value of meals or lodging furnished for the employer's
convenience from gross income); I.R.C. § 132 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (excluding listed fringe
benefits from an employee's gross income). A business owner's status as an employee of a
closely held corporation allows these exclusions to apply.
16. See I.R.C. § 402(a) (1994) (discussing the taxability of the beneficiaries of qualified
trusts).
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corresponds precisely with deferred income recognition. A participant
in a qualified retirement plan normally reports no income with respect
to plan contributions as long as they remain titled in the name of the
plan's trustee. 
17
If the owner instead chooses to leave profits in the business in order
to enhance its value, the owner's income recognition consequences
more closely resemble those resulting from a qualified retirement plan
contribution rather than the income tax consequences associated with
current consumption. 18 The precise tax effect to the owner as a result of
leaving profits in the business will depend on whether the owner
conducts the business in a separately taxed entity, 19 and how the
retained profits are applied toward business uses. 20 If a separately taxed
corporation retains profits, its independent tax posture will determine
the surrogate liability that the corporation's owner indirectly bears,
especially to the extent that retained earnings correspond with corporate
taxable income. 2 1  If the small business is incorporated, retained
earnings might result in either no additional taxable income to the
entity, 22 or taxable income that costs the entity no more than fifteen
cents per dollar.23  As a result, the effect of retaining $30,000 in the
business (as opposed to diverting the same $30,000 to a qualified
retirement plan) 24 need not result in significant additional income
17. Disqualification of a plan for failure to meet the lengthy requirements of section 401(a) of
the Code spoils the tax-favored deferral of income recognition. See I.R.C. § 402(b) (1994) (dis-
cussing the taxability of the beneficiaries of nonexempt trusts).
18. See generally I.R.C. § 162 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (discussing the impact of business
expense deductions).
19. Entities other than corporations can recognize income separately as a result of the "check
the box" regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1996) (allowing some unincorporated orga-
nizations to elect to be taxed as corporations).
20. Some business expenses will produce immediate offsetting deductions. See I.R.C. §
162(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Other expenses, such as capital purchases that produce depre-
ciation deductions under section 168, will defer offsetting deductions until later taxable years.
See I.R.C. § 168 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999). Of course, the business owner can defer immediate
deductions by letting retained earnings accumulate for subsequent purchases of goods or services
that benefit the business.
21. The surrogate tax liability experienced at the entity level can involve favorable income
taxation rate differences because of the separate rate table used for corporations under section 11.
See I.R.C. § 11 (b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (providing the tax rate schedule for corporations).
22. The corporation might absorb additional taxable income associated with retained earnings
into net operating losses carried over from prior years. See I.R.C. § 172(b)(l)(A)(ii) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997) (allowing net operating loss carryovers "to each of the 20 taxable years following
year of loss").
23. The marginal rate on the first $50,000 of a corporation's taxable income is 15%. See
I.R.C. § 11 (b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
24. See I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) (1994) (stating that contributions are limited to $30,000 or 25%
of the participant's compensation).
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recognition or tax cost for the business owner.25  Diverting the same
payment to personal consumption could result in a greater tax cost if the
owner's income is taxed at higher marginal rates than those of the
entity. 2
6
Even if the owner operates a small business as a proprietorship or as
a pass-through entity like a partnership, S corporation, or limited
liability company, the personal tax effect of diverting a potential
retirement plan contribution to retained profits will at worst
approximate the immediate tax effect of earnings devoted to personal
consumption. 27  Unlike money taken for personal consumption,
however, money retained in a business for future business uses has the
potential to mitigate the business owner's future income tax liabilities. 28
Using retained profits later to make potentially deductible business
expenditures will result in less future taxable income to the owner.29 If
the owner converts retained revenues into business expenditures in the
same taxable year as the owner would otherwise have made a retirement
plan contribution using the same money, retaining earnings will have a
tax effect similar to that of a retirement plan contribution, as long as the
business expenditures produce immediate deductions. 30
If the owner converts retained profits into business expenditures in
later taxable years, the difference in income recognition consequences
between a current plan contribution and retained profits becomes a
matter of tax benefit deferral. The extent of the deferral depends on the
business owner's informed discretion in timing the expenditures that
25. In addition to the plan contribution on behalf of the owner-executive, section 401(a) could
require contributions on behalf of other employees, potentially making the plan more expensive
to maintain than the income tax liability, if any, associated with retaining the earnings in the busi-
ness. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (disallowing discrimination in favor of
highly compensated employees).
26. See I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (outlining the progressive tax rates for
married individuals, heads of household, and unmarried individuals).
27. See supra note 20 (discussing the impact of deferred deductions).
28. Such investment would be treated as a business or capital expense. See I.R.C. § 162 (West
1988 & Supp. 1999).
29. In fact, the owner's deferral of deductible business expenditures might produce a greater
marginal tax savings as a result of rate bracket shifts under the progressive impositions of sec-
tions l(a)-(d). See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999). Expenditures for personal con-
sumption produce no deductions. See I.R.C. § 262 (1994).
30. Compare I.R.C. § 168 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (providing for accelerated cost recovery
for depreciation deductions), § 195 (1994) (providing for deductions that amortize an expense
over a period of years), and § 197 (Supp. 1H. 1997) (involving the acquisition of business assets
having a useful life beyond the current year), with I.R.C. § 162 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (pro-
viding for deductions for expenditures that pertain only to the current year).
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frequently produce immediate tax deductions when paid or incurred.31
If the business owner's tax adviser gives careful thought to this
discretionary timing issue, deferral of deductible expenditures from
retained profits can produce tax savings if later deductions offset higher
rate bracket income. 32 Regardless of when retained profits turn into
business expenditures, the income recognition effect of retaining profits
more closely resembles that of deductible contributions to a qualified
retirement plan than the tax effect of distributions to the owner for
immediate consumption.
B. Economic Consequences to the Business Owner Before Deferred
Gratification Turns Into Future Consumption
If a business owner funds a qualified retirement plan, the plan's
trustee invests the contributions until future distributions are necessary.
This produces economic benefits and taxation advantages that have
helped popularize qualified retirement plans. 33  Economically, the
participant hopes that compounded investment returns on plan
contributions will create wealth that far exceeds any inflationary
devaluation of plan assets. This hope has been a reality for many
participants as domestic equities have increased in value beyond
inflation for many years. 34 The small business owner who establishes a
qualified retirement account might benefit more by investing in publicly
traded businesses controlled by others than by putting the same money
back into the enterprise. 35 With the uncertainty of equities markets in
31. For example, an owner has a great deal of discretion in deciding whether and when to re-
place equipment used in the business with more efficient models and whether and when to spend
retained earnings on a marketing consultant who might help increase sales volume. An immedi-
ate deduction for the former might result under the election to expense certain depreciable busi-
ness assets. See I.R.C. § 179 (1994 & Supp. H 1997).
32. The tax paid today might be based on a different tax rate than a tax paid later on the same
amount of taxable income because of changes in the Internal Revenue Code or rate bracket varia-
tions resulting from the taxpayer's shifting tax and economic characteristics.
33. The economic advantages of prudent investment of plan contributions compound more
efficiently as a result of the trust's freedom from income taxation. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994)
(providing tax exemption for the trust of a qualified retirement plan).
34. The booming equities markets of the late 1990s underscored the importance of both in-
vestment diversification, as evidenced by the so-called "indexed" funds, and the patience neces-
sary to outlast bear markets and take full advantage of bull markets. An owner's direct invest-
ment in a business frequently reflects these concepts as well. Diversification through aggregation
of businesses, product lines, and goods/services combinations often accompanies a long-term
commitment to business ownership that may span generations of owners.
35. On the other hand, a failure to devote sufficient reinvestment into the directly-owned op-
eration might jeopardize its future stability to the extent that retirement plan contributions must
diminish or cease despite the benefits of investment diversification offered through retirement
plan accumulations. Plan contributions do not yield greater investment diversification if the busi-
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today's global business environment, however, many small business
owners will choose to reinvest in their own businesses.
Some owners of closely held businesses will view qualified
retirement plan investments as an opportunity to diversify total
investments into a personally controlled component (the closely held
business itself) and a broader component that places faith in the
economic growth potential of leading domestic corporations.36 Other
owners, especially those who sense the growth potential of their own
endeavors, will prefer to devote all their capital to the expansion of the
source of wealth in which they have far greater control, knowledge, and
interest. This will happen at the expense of investment in the efforts of
other entrepreneurs. Instead of worrying about the Dow Jones average
and which particular stocks will likely excel in the future, many small
business owners choose to focus all their energies on optimizing their
entrepreneurial choices.
Money applied toward the growth of a closely held business tangibly
can offer more excitement, satisfaction, and self-affirmation than if left
to feed a retirement plan that is dependent on the incomprehensible
value fluctuations of publicly-held entities. Thirty thousand dollars not
put into an owner's retirement account 37 could provide an incentive for
an underpaid, rising star salesman who might double the business's
sales. That person might otherwise jump ship to a competitor and take
key customers along for the ride. The same money could purchase a
new machine in anticipation of expanded production, initiate an
advertising campaign that brings in dozens of new customers, or pay a
retainer to a patent attorney who pursues an otherwise dormant
infringement claim.38
ness owner cannot afford them due to the poor economic health of the "goose that lays the golden
egg." Reinvestment in the business often provides the goose's staple diet.
36. Sometimes the choice does not manifest as an "either/or" selection but rather becomes a
matter of choosing a proper mix between plan contributions and reinvestment in the business.
For this reason, small employers who do implement a qualified retirement plan often prefer to
sponsor a profit-sharing plan under section 401(a), which allows them to determine how much to
contribute from year to year as an exercise of their business discretion. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (West
1988 & Supp. 1999). By contrast, qualified pension plans create fixed future funding liabilities as
a result of the requirement that the plans systematically pay definitely determinable benefits. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1976) (stating that pension plans "provide system-
atically for the payment of definitely determinable benefits ... over a period of years, usually for
life, after retirement").
37. The contribution to a qualified retirement plan on behalf of an owner might exceed
$30,000 annually if the plan is a defined benefit plan. See I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (1994). But see
I.R.C. § 415(c)( 1) (1994) (concerning limitations on defined contribution plans).
38. To the extent any of these expenditures enhance the overall value of the business, the
owner can increase the potential future capital gain resulting from a later disposition of the busi-
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Prudent reinvestment in a small but growing business under the
owner's direct control not only serves ownership, but also boosts
employment and the economy in general. 39 Thus, the temptation to
divert discretionary profits into pension plan contributions can lead to
an unintended implication of qualified plan policy. Economists can
argue the relative efficiencies of consumption versus savings in
advancing our national economy, but the relative efficiencies of small
business reinvestment versus investments in publicly traded securities
can produce just as lively a debate. n° Regardless, many small business
owners, given the choice to place a limited amount of unconsumed
profits into either a qualified retirement plan or their own enterprise,
will choose the latter because of the perception that they will have
greater economic control and future growth prospects.
C. Tax Consequences to the Business Owner Before and Upon
Cashing Out
The trust of a qualified retirement plan normally does not pay income
tax on earnings it realizes from investments of contributions.41  The
qualified plan's trust will be subject to tax only if income results from
the direct active conduct of a business or otherwise falls under the
unrelated business income tax rules.42  Neither an employer's
contributions to the trustee nor the trust's investment earnings cause
income recognition to the trust's beneficiaries until the trustee actually
distributes money or other property from the trust.43  Unlike other
ness and thereby secure a preferential rate of taxation. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 1988 & Supp.
1999) (defining capital gains rates). Plans holding contributions invested in equities that appreci-
ate in value actually convert appreciation otherwise taxed as capital gain into ordinary income
taxed at higher rates as a result of I.R.C. § 402(a) and its incorporation by reference of section 72,
which taxes plan distributions as though they came from annuities and not capital assets. See in-
fra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing characterization of gains from various dispo-
sitions).
39. Forty million Americans work in enterprises that have 100 or fewer employees. See Ellen
E. Shultz, Small-Company Pensions Spur Lawmakers' Concern, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1999, at
Cl.
40. In 1999, an interesting question for market pundits pertained to whether stocks in popular
American companies had values determined more by demand and investor psychology than by
economic fundamentals.
41. See I.R.C. § 501 (a) (1994) (providing tax exemption for the trust of a qualified retirement
plan).
42. See I.R.C. §§ 511-514 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (providing for the imposition of taxes
on certain exempt organizations' business income).
43. See I.R.C. § 402(a) (1994) (discussing the taxation of an employee trust's beneficiary).
Likewise, income realizations in individual retirement accounts are not subject to tax until dis-
tributed. See I.R.C. § 408(d)(1) (1994). Income taxation results only if plans fail to meet the
technical requirements of their respective qualification schemes. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 402(b) (1994)
[Vol. 31
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compensatory receivables, a qualified plan's accrued benefits do not
cause income recognition under the doctrine of constructive receipt
because merely making distributions available under a plan does not
amount to actual distribution of plan benefits. 44
Leaving discretionary profits in the business that produced them
tends to enhance the value of the business in indiscernible increments
that do not convert to income realizations until the owner disposes of an
interest in the business. 45  Because economic realization must precede
taxation when property, including a business interest, changes
ownership, a business owner not under a prior contractual restraint has
complete discretion in timing income recognition from the disposition
of a business interest.46  Accordingly, a business owner's power to
control both the disposition of an interest and resulting income
recognition parallels the distribution recognition feature of qualified
retirement plans. At least three differences, however, actually favor
business interests over qualified retirement benefits.
First, a business interest disposition can occur more freely than
distributions from a qualified retirement trust. A retirement trust's
qualification strictures often include rules that preclude plan
distributions until certain designated events have happened, such as
death, disability, retirement, or other separation from service.47  These
strictures apply even if the business owner owns 100% of the employer
that sponsors a qualified plan and even if the business owner owns the
plan's only accrued benefit.48
(discussing the taxability of the beneficiaries of nonexempt trusts).
44. See I.R.C. § 402(a) (1994) (stating that "any amount actually distributed ... shall be tax-
able to the distributee .... " (emphasis added)). When Code section 402(a) used the words "dis-
tributed or made available," it allowed constructive receipt applications, which potentially oc-
curred prior to 1982. This transition from taxation of "available" amounts to amounts "actually
distributed" occurred under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §
3 14(c), 95 Stat. 172, 286 (1981).
45. Although an unwise investment in a closely held business could diminish its value, unwise
investments in a qualified retirement trust could similarly diminish accrued benefits. One glaring
difference in this comparison results under the fiduciary responsibility rules imposed under sec-
tion 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829, 877 (1974). Bad investments in a qualified retirement plan can not only hurt an owner-
participant, but all other plan participants as well. Declining values thus invite scrutiny for possi-
ble claims that the plan administrator and trustee have breached their fiduciary duties.
46. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1994) (defining the computation of gain or loss from the sale or dis-
position of property).
47. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401(k)(2)(B)(i) (1994) (listing events that trigger section 401(k) plan
distributions).
48. A one-participant plan could result where the plan sponsor is properly using only the
services of independent contractors instead of employees, thus leaving only the owner of the
business with the status of an eligible participating employee. A qualified retirement plan cannot
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Second, the qualified plan scheme forces a participant/business
owner to commence taking distributions soon after reaching age seventy
and one-half despite any contrary desire to continue income recognition
deferral.49 On the other hand, a business owner need not wait until a
technically required event's occurrence before disposing of an interest
in the enterprise. The owner can hold on to an interest until death.
Again, the rigidity of the qualified plan undermines its value as a
retirement option for closely held business owners, and by extension
helps to preclude common employees from optimum retirement savings.
Third, those business owners who hold on to their interests until
death create a distinct income taxation advantage for their estates or
other beneficiaries who subsequently dispose of the business. Although
the capital gain otherwise resulting from a business interest disposition
can disappear altogether with the assignment of a date-of-death
valuation basis,50 income recognition confronts the beneficiaries of a
decedent's qualified plan interest because of an "income in respect of a
decedent" rule. 5 1 Under this rule, a surviving beneficiary who gets a
qualified retirement account takes the decedent's basis in the account
(often zero) and thus reports substantial income upon distribution of the
account, because the distribution represents income the decedent had a
right to prior to death. To the contrary, a surviving beneficiary who gets
appreciated stock outside of a qualified retirement account can sell the
stock with a stepped-up basis equal to its value at the time of the
decedent's death and consequently avoid the gain recognition that
otherwise would occur with the decedent's lower basis. 52
Furthermore, although cashing out an appreciated interest in a
business before death often produces capital gain, qualified plan
distributions, whether made before or after the plan participant's death,
cover workers who do not have the status of employees. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (1994) (requiring
that a trust be used for the "exclusive benefit" of employees or their beneficiaries).
49. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(A), (C) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing that the required begin-
ning date is April 1 of the calendar year following the later of the year the employee turns age 70
or when the employee retires).
50. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (setting the basis of an asset at its fair
market value at the decedent's death).
51. I.R.C. § 1014(c) (1994) (disallowing the fair market value at death basis rule when a bene-
ficiary receives income in respect to a decedent); see also I.R.C. § 691 (1994 & Supp. [H 1997)
(defining the concept of income in respect of a decedent).
52. Inter vivos transfers of appreciated business interests made gratuitously, however, do not
afford a fair market value date-of-transfer basis, which is allowed for testamentary dispositions.
See I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1994) (providing generally that a donee takes the donor's basis for gifted
property).
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frequently generate ordinary income payments as from an annuity.
53
Investment assets earned within a qualified plan's trust, whether
produced by dividends, interest, rents, royalties, or capital appreciation
upon sale of securities held in the trust's portfolio, are ultimately subject
to tax at rates up to 39.6%. 4 Long term capital gains, on the other
hand, are taxed at lower preferential rates. 55 In effect, a qualified plan
operates like a financial machine that silently converts capital
appreciation into ordinary income as a by-product of income
recognition deferral.
Only in very limited circumstances does a qualified plan produce the
desired product without the undesired side effect. If a qualified plan
distributes appreciated securities issued by the plan's sponsoring em-
ployer, the participant can eventually recognize the "net unrealized ap-
preciation" from the securities as capital gain. 56 In addition, a partici-
pant born before 1936 might recognize a portion of a lump sum
distribution as capital gain subject to a fixed twenty percent tax rate if
the participant's plan participation predates 1974.57 Although not spe-
cifically allowing a rate reduction in the guise of capital gains taxation,
for twenty-five years Internal Revenue Code § 402(d) permitted partici-
pants receiving qualifying lump sum distributions to use an income av-
eraging mechanism to reduce the effective rate of taxation.
58
Unfortunately, most participants in qualified retirement plans cannot
take advantage of income averaging for lump sum distributions after
1999. Plan distributees will incur full taxation under ordinary income
rates, except in special situations involving direct distributions of
employer securities or lump sum distributions to now-older participants
53. See supra note 38 (explaining that distributions from qualified plans, which are invested in
capital assets that appreciated in value, are taxed as ordinary income rather than as capital gain).
Cashed-out business interests normally constitute capital assets under I.R.C. § 1221. See I.R.C. §
1221 (1994) (listing properties that are not capital assets).
54. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (defining the normal income tax liability
structure for individuals of different filing statuses).
55. Code section l(h)(1)(C) imposes a general capital gains rate of taxation that does not ex-
ceed 20% of a taxpayer's adjusted net capital gain. See I.R.C. § l(h)(1)(C) (West 1988 & Supp.
1999).
56. See Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-(l)(b)(1)(i)(b) (1960).
57. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1122(h), 100 Stat. 2085, 2470-71
(1986).
58. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2005(a),
88 Stat. 829, 987 (1974) ("ERISA") introduced ten-year income averaging for qualified plan
lump sum distributions. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1122(a), 100 Stat.
2085, 2466 (1986), reduced the averaging period from ten years to five years. The Small Busi-
ness Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1401(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1787 (1996),
repealed five-year income averaging effective for the years beginning after December 31, 1999.
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who accrued service before 1974. 59
By contrast, disposition of a business interest frequently qualifies for
a capital gain's preferred rate of taxation.60 Higher rates can result, but
such a result would be an exception, just as qualified plan distributions
sometimes fit into low rate exceptions. 61 The owner of an incorporated
business would likely have held his interest sufficiently long that favor-
able capital gains taxation would result upon disposition of the stock.62
Small business owners normally experience growth in the value of their
stock over a period of many years. Whether the entrepreneur exchanges
stock in a sale, swap, redemption, or liquidation, a long-term capital
gain usually results. 63
The owner of a proprietorship will recognize ordinary income upon
disposition of a business only to the extent a portion of the sale proceeds
reflects disposition of particular ordinary income assets, such as
inventory or accounts receivable. Other assets used in the business and
goodwill built up over the years will produce the more desirable long-
term capital gain for a sole proprietor.64 Accordingly, the tax benefits
of reinvesting in a proprietorship impair an employee's chance of
having an employer-sponsored retirement plan.
59. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, § 1401(c)(2) at 1789.
60. A disposition of appreciated stock in a closely held corporation would result in capital
gains taxation because the stock would likely fit the definition of a capital asset. See I.R.C. §
1221 (1994) (defining a capital asset for the purpose of determining capital gains and losses).
61. Respecting a stock disposition, a higher rate of taxation would result if the owner did not
hold the stock for the holding period necessary to produce the net capital gain rate preference un-
der section l(h). See I.R.C. § 1222(11) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (defining "net capital gain"
with reference to "net long-term capital gain," which involves holding a capital asset for more
than one year). Respecting direct dispositions of business assets under unincorporated forms of
ownership, ordinary income assets, like inventory, would produce ordinary gain that is taxed at
higher rates. See I.R.C. § 1221(1) (1994) (defining inventory as other than a capital asset).
62. If the owner holds the stock for more than five years, the stock might meet the definition
of "qualified small business stock" and thus qualify for a 50% exclusion from gross income when
the owner disposes of the stock and realizes a gain. See I.R.C. § 1202 (West Supp. 1999).
Holding stock for at least one year ("long-term" under section 1222) qualifies the stock for "net
capital gain." I.R.C. § 1222(11) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999)). This permits the taxpayer to re-
ceive the preferential rate. See I.R.C. § l(h)(l) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
63. Redemptions of stock can produce the desired tax result if they meet the rules of section
302, which distinguishes redemptions that should, by their substance, result in proceeds taxed as
dividends. See I.R.C. § 302 (1994) (defining the conditions under which a corporation's redemp-
tion of its stock shall be treated as a distribution in part or in full payment for the stock).
64. See I.R.C. § 1221 (1994) (defining a capital asset for the purpose of determining capital
gains and losses); I.R.C. § 1231 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (defining the conditions under which
gains on sales or exchanges of property used in the trade or business, plus the recognized gains
from the compulsory or involuntary conversion of such property, shall be considered as capital
asset gains or losses).
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The owner of a partnership interest can incur some recognition of
ordinary income depending on whether the partner disposes of the
interest in a sale or liquidation. An appreciated partnership interest sold
or exchanged to a new or existing partner will produce capital gain
recognition for the disposing partner.65 An exception, which parallels
the recognition results for a disposing sole proprietor, exists to the
extent that the proceeds reflect an underlying disposition of unrealized
ordinary income receivables or partnership inventory. 66 A blend of tax
consequences occurs when a retiring or deceased partner's interest is
liquidated and payments from the entity to the withdrawing member
follow. This blend can include: a tax-free return of basis, ordinary
income recognition due to the partner's underlying interests in
inventory, accounts receivable, or sometimes goodwill, and capital gain
recognition attributable to the partner's underlying interest in assets that
would produce capital gain if sold by the partnership. 67
In general, a disposing partner's conglomeration of recognition
consequences upon disposition of a partnership interest lets him or her
fare no worse than participants of a qualified plan upon receiving
distributions of accrued benefits. Qualified plan distributions can
involve a tax-free return of basis68 and even capital gains in the special
cases previously mentioned. The most likely tax consequence from
plan payments, however, remains ordinary income recognition because
plan distributions have the predominant character of realizations of
compensatory receivables accrued for past services rendered. 69
Partnership interest dispositions, by contrast, frequently afford greater
opportunities for capital gains recognition as a result of the value
attributable to the subject enterprise's goodwill.7°
65. See I.R.C. § 741 (1994) (providing that the gain or loss in the sale or exchange of a part-
nership interest shall be recognized to the disposing partner and is considered as the gain or loss
of a capital asset, except as specified in section 751 regarding unrealized receivables and inven-
tory).
66. See I.R.C. § 751 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (defining the conditions under which pro-
ceeds from receivables and inventory are considered non-capital asset property).
67. See I.R.C. § 736 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999); Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1 (1960) (defining the
conditions under which payments made in liquidation of a retiring or deceased partner's interest
shall be considered as a distribution, a distributive share, or a guaranteed payment).
68. See I.R.C. § 72(c)(1), (f) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (providing rules for computing
amounts invested in a particular plan).
69. See I.R.C. § 1221(4) (1994) (noting that the definition of capital asset does not include
accounts receivable acquired in the ordinary course of business for services rendered).
70. Pursuant to Code section 736(b)(2)(B), a partnership's payments in liquidation of a de-
parting partner's interest for goodwill of the partnership can result from a deemed exchange. See
I.R.C. § 736(b)(2)(B) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999). This permits capital gain recognition as long
as the partnership agreement provides for a payment with respect to goodwill. See id. Thus,
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In any event, a small business owner who wants to insure that the
disposition of his interest will completely avoid ordinary income
recognition can always choose to incorporate rather than conduct
business as a partnership or other entity, like a limited liability
company, which invokes partnership tax consequences. 71 Regardless of
the business owner's entity choice for conducting business, the income
recognition deferral possibilities respecting long-term growth of the
business and the potential to obtain a low rate taxation on disposition
proceeds favor allocating profits to business reinvestment rather than
qualified retirement plan contributions.
III. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF THE DE FACTO RETIREMENT SCHEME FOR
SMALL BuSINESS OWNERS
The income taxation features of qualified retirement plans involve a
number of rules that mandate contributions for rank and file employees,
restrict a sponsoring employer's access to retirement funds, and cause
loss of tax advantages (disqualification) if plan administrators do not
carefully observe social protections against certain alienations of
accrued benefits. Business reinvestment, however, allows a business
owner to accumulate wealth for retirement without these complications.
A. Reinvestment of Profits Avoids Nondiscrimination Rules, Forced
Coverage, and Mandated Contributions for Rank and File Workers
Not only can a small business owner achieve better tax benefits than
those offered under qualified plans by simply keeping profits in the
business itself, but the owner can also avoid the complicated
qualification scheme of formal retirement plans while still providing
personal retirement income security from future disposition of the
business. 72  One of the most important rules of the retirement plan
partnership agreements commonly include a clause designating liquidation proceeds in exchange
for goodwill, in order to prevent treatment of such payments as distributions of ordinary partner-
ship income. See I.R.C. § 736(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (defining conditions under which
payments made to a retiring or deceased partner shall be considered as a distributive share or
guaranteed payment).
71. Incorporation need not result in payment of entity income tax. Aside from Subchapter S
status governed by Code sections 1361-1378, which may eliminate any entity level tax otherwise
applicable, corporations operating small businesses frequently eliminate income tax liability by
making sufficient deductible outlays to cause their taxable income to fall to zero. See I.R.C. §
162 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (allowing for deductibility of various business expenses).
72. The qualification scheme of section 401(a) spans 34 paragraphs of technical requirements,
but some of these paragraphs incorporate by reference entire other sections of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999). For example, the vesting rules desig-
nated under section 401(a)(7) could not fit into a mere paragraph under subsection (a) and thus
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qualification scheme prohibits economic discrimination that benefits
highly compensated employees 73 to a greater extent than nonhighly
compensated employees. 74 Through voluminous and complex Treasury
regulations, this principle requires periodic testing to determine whether
rank and file employees in a qualified plan fare proportionately as well
as their better paid colleagues. 75
This nondiscrimination principle requires a calculation of how many
employees in a particular company must participate in a qualified plan
during a year.76 The participation rules of the qualified plan scheme
grant several exemptions that sponsoring employers can use to
minimize coverage obligations.77 Most employers, however, must incur
at least some coverage costs on behalf of non-highly compensated
employees in order to secure the privilege of including owners and other
managerial or professional employees in their retirement plans.78 Once
a sponsoring employer determines its mandatory plan participants, yet
another set of rules can require minimum contributions on behalf of a
technically defined group of rank and file participants known as "non-
key employee[s]." 9
These discrimination strictures and their attendant cost implications
become serious impediments to the establishment of a qualified
retirement plan covering the owner and other highly compensated
employees of an enterprise. A business owner who forgoes contributing
a portion of profits to a qualified plan in order to increase business
reinvestment achieves personal retirement security through a more
valuable business for later disposition and avoids these discrimination
strictures. 80 The only risk in not implementing a qualified retirement
appear instead as section 411. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999). A business
owner who uses the business itself as a form of retirement savings avoids the morass of complex-
ity that plagues formal retirement arrangements. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
73. Section 414(q) defines "highly compensated employee" as a person with at least five per-
cent ownership of the employer sponsoring the plan or as any employee earning in excess of
$80,000 per year. See I.R.C. § 414(q) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
74. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
75. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4) (as amended in 1993).
76. Section 401(a)(3) incorporates section 410, which defines the minimum participation
standards for qualified retirement plans. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
77. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (identifying one such exemption permitted under
Code section 410, which allows an employer to exclude part-time employees who work less than
1000 hours per year).
78. See I.R.C. § 410(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
79. See I.R.C. § 416(c)(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
80. In some instances, the existence of a qualified retirement plan can actually diminish the
value of a business because prospective buyers might discount the business' value if they view
the plan's future funding as a substantial liability.
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plan is the failure to diversify retirement resources through the
investment of plan funds in a broad array of marketable securities. 8 1
This risk, however, is mitigated because even if an entrepreneur puts all
retirement eggs in one basket, the entrepreneur personally holds that
basket's handle and is not at the mercy of the poor investment judgment
of others.
In addition to assuring her own retirement security, an enterprise
owner can easily address the retirement income security needs of
important executives, managers, or other key personnel by either
awarding them non-controlling interests in the business82 or setting up
non-qualified deferred compensation arrangements that need not adhere
to the discrimination rules that plague qualified arrangements.83 In this
way, a business owner can acquire and retain highly skilled and
productive employees without offering a qualified retirement savings
device as a special inducement. Because non-qualified arrangements do
not attempt to achieve taxation advantages beyond mere recognition
deferral for future income promised, an employer can design specialized
plans that cover only one executive at a time without compliance with
the many qualification rules of Internal Revenue Code § 401(a).
A business owner can generally hire and retain non-key employees
simply by offering a competitive wage without addressing their
retirement income security needs beyond mandatory contributions to the
Social Security system.84 If, however, these less powerful employees
wish to build retirement income security for themselves beyond the
relatively modest payments granted under the Social Security system,
they, unlike their employer, have very limited discretion in deciding
whether and how to establish a tax-favored device to serve their needs. 85
81. Some qualified retirement plans-stock bonus plans, for instance-provide only minimal
investment diversification because they involve large amounts of securities issued by the spon-
soring employer. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)(l)(iii) (1956).
82. See I.R.C. §§ 421-424 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (regarding income tax treatment for
stock options granted by employers).
83. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174-81 (discussing the doctrine of constructive receipt
as applied to certain deferred compensation arrangements).
84. Even if these employees participate in a qualified retirement plan by taking into account
Social Security contributions under a complex process known as Social Security "integration,"
their employer may lessen contributions to the plan on their behalf. See I.R.C. § 401(l) (West
1988 & Supp. 1999).
85. Outside of a $2000 annual contribution to an individual retirement account permitted un-
der section 408(a), a worker who wants to participate in a retirement arrangement under section
401(a), but whose employer does not sponsor a plan would have to cease employment and be-
come an independent provider of services. Then the worker would have to set up a qualified plan
for herself, assuming the role of an employer. Two problems hinder this approach: first, the
worker must personally incur the expense and complexity of plan sponsorship; second, and more
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Under the current system for qualified retirement arrangements, the
lower level employees' predicament can result directly from their
employer's ability to achieve personal retirement income security
outside of qualified plans. This inherent conflict of interest is unlikely
to change so long as employers can only help their employees at the
employer's expense.
B. The Qualified Retirement Plan Scheme Restricts a Business
Owner's Access to Capital
In addition to qualified plan restrictions on the timing of
distributions, 86 a business owner who chooses to invest surplus profits
in a qualified retirement plan faces numerous complex rules that restrict
the ability of plan participants to borrow from their accrued benefits. 87
Most importantly, an entrepreneur who builds up a substantial accrued
benefit in a qualified plan, perhaps exceeding $1,000,000, can borrow
no more than $50,000 at a time against that benefit without incurring
prohibitory tax consequences. 88 A substantial diversion of profits into a
qualified retirement plan thus restricts access to capital that might
temporarily benefit an enterprise.
On the other hand, profits retained to enhance the value of a business
permit the owner to obtain increasing amounts of outside credit as the
business grows. 89 The owner can borrow considerably more than the
$50,000 permitted under the qualified plan rules from outside sources.
In some instances, retained profits in the business might be liquid
enough to allow self-financing and avoidance of borrowing altogether. 90
significantly, the recipient of the worker's services would have to surrender sufficient control
over the worker to create a status of independence and might not be willing to do so, short of dis-
charging the worker altogether.
86. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that the rules for a qualified plan require
a plan participant or owner to begin taking distributions at a specified age); see also I.R.C. § 72(t)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (imposing a penalty tax against qualified plan distributions made too
early).
87. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4975(a), (c)(l)(B), (d)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (prescribing a pen-
alty tax on prohibited transactions, which include the lending of money or extension of credit
from a plan to a person who is defined as "disqualified" under particular circumstances).
88. See I.R.C. § 72(p)(2)(A) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
89. Interest expense deductions pertaining to outside business debt add an economic en-
hancement not always available when borrowing in the qualified retirement plan context. The
deductions otherwise permitted under sections 163(a) and 163(h)(2)(A) do not benefit a business
owner who properly borrows from the owner's accrued benefit in a qualified plan. See I.R.C. §
72 (p)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
90. Accumulated corporate earnings that meet the "reasonable needs of the business" standard
of section 535(c)(1) would escape the accumulated earnings tax imposed under section 531. See
I.R.C. § 535(c)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (defining "reasonable needs of the business"); see
also I.R.C. § 531 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
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Either way, by directly using retained profits or by borrowing against
value augmentations attributable to retained profits, the enterprise
owner achieves better access to self-generated capital in choosing to
leave earnings in the business than by diverting them to a qualified
plan.9
1
When an entrepreneur needs additional capital to expand market
opportunities, hire key personnel, acquire new facilities and equipment,
develop new technology, or acquire intellectual property, past profits
put into a qualified retirement plan will offer little assistance. On the
other hand, past profits kept in the business help accelerate continuous
expansion by offering a ready pool of capital. Contributions to
qualified retirement plans diminish the pool of available capital because
qualification restrictions prevent the sponsoring employer from using
the plan's assets for business purposes.92 Again, an employer's profit-
making interests directly conflict with an employee's interests in saving
for retirement.
In one respect, retirement plan contributions devoted to workers other
than owners may constitute a form of reinvestment in the business. 93
This is the case because compensatory enhancements, either immediate
or deferred, can lead to increased productivity, retention of valuable
employees, and an overall better position for the employer in labor
markets. These advantages do enhance the value of a business.
Nevertheless, the qualified retirement plan scheme contains so many
diverse restrictions on how, when, and to whom plan benefits accrue
that serious questions arise with respect to the economic efficiency of
qualified retirement arrangements. The value-enhancing employment
effects that clearly result from more direct, immediate compensatory
awards are easier and less costly to implement than a retirement plan.
Direct compensatory awards produce their desired results through
linking the hiring, retention, and productivity of particular employees
with specific monetary incentives. These incentives fluctuate
circumstantially under bonus programs, salary scales, job classification
91. A business owner could only borrow against the owner's personal interest in a qualified
retirement plan. Borrowing from the interests of other plan participants would violate the "exclu-
sive benefit" rule of section 401(a)(2) and thus disqualify the plan. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (West
1988 & Supp. 1999).
92. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
93. Almost all qualified retirement plans involve substantial employer contributions. Even
"cash or deferred" arrangements under section 401(k) frequently involve employer matching
contributions in addition to employee contributions. Matching contributions encourage elective
participation and thus help a 401(k) plan meet its "deferral percentage" tests. See I.R.C. §
401(k)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
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structures, and other arrangements that an employer can design, alter, or
terminate nearly at will. 94  Although a sponsoring employer can
exercise some flexibility in making formal deferred compensation
allocations that selectively and conditionally reward particular
employees, 95 heavy regulation prevents qualified retirement plans from
serving as the best way for an employer to structure compensatory
incentives.
For example, an employer who skews contribution allocations under
a qualified profit-sharing plan according to a formula that rewards
production attainments would have to monitor and potentially adjust
results under the formula each year in order to avoid disqualification of
the plan under the discrimination rules.96 Similarly, an employer could
not indefinitely suspend contributions to a profit-sharing plan in the face
of a long-term decline in workforce productivity without retroactively
jeopardizing the plan's qualification status. 97  Additionally, the
qualification scheme's participation rules could require coverage of
more workers than the number of employees for whom special
incentives would produce measurable effects on workforce productivity
and stability.98 Because of the coverage and allocation rules of the
qualified retirement plan scheme, 99 compensatory incentives that do not
include qualified retirement plans offer greater efficiency.
94. The primary limitations against these implementations usually relate to employee morale
problems, union agreements, or the threat of unionization.
95. A sponsoring employer could carefully select categories of employees who do not partici-
pate in a qualified plan as long as the total number of excluded employees does not offend the
applicable statutory exclusion computations. See I.R.C. § 410(b)(A)-(B) (West 1988 & Supp.
1999) (defining the minimum coverage requirements that a qualified plan must meet).
96. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-2, 3 (as amended in 1993). Disqualification would result if
the formula generated inordinately favorable allocations for highly compensated employees. The
definition of production attainment would have to change to accommodate nonhighly compen-
sated employees. A formula that stressed sales increases and cost attainments might have to ac-
count better for "blue collar" factors like unit production and hours worked. If after such a
change the formula still inordinately rewarded highly compensated employees, further adjust-
ments would have to occur in a following year. If, thereafter, rank and file participants started to
receive inordinately large allocations, additional fine-tuning of the formula could occur in yet a
later year, and so on until the employer realized a correct balance.
97. See I.R.C. § 41 l(d)(3)(B) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
98. Some jobs do not readily permit effective use of special incentives. Compare janitorial
and file clerk positions with production and sales jobs.
99. See infra Part III.C (discussing the social agenda aspects of the qualified retirement plan
scheme).
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C. The Social Agenda of a Qualified Plan Presents Employers with
Additional Problems and Disincentives
Qualified retirement plans must comply with many rules in addition
to those that impose limitations on the employer's access to capital and
mandate coverage and contributions under discrimination precepts.
Internal Revenue Code § 401 and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 1°° include a variety of regulatory
impositions designed to make sponsoring employers agents for the
enforcement of social principles that reflect how Congress thought
pension arrangements should operate. This is an added hurdle to an
already difficult mechanism that only ends up harming many of the
employees it was meant to protect.
Many qualified retirement plans require administrators to monitor
benefit dispositions to a participant's beneficiaries in order to protect
the interests of surviving spouses. 10 As a default rule, a qualified plan
usually must provide a residual benefit for a surviving spouse at least
equal to one-half of the benefit available to a plan participant prior to
death. 0 2 A participant who wishes to name a beneficiary other than a
surviving spouse must secure formal, written consent from the
participant's spouse.'0 3 The duties of keeping track of beneficiary
designation changes, implementing detailed procedures for excluding a
spouse with consent, and taking into account changes in the marital
status of plan participants fall directly upon the plan administrator, and
thus indirectly on the plan's sponsoring employer. 104
Because lack of enforcement of the joint and survivor payment rules
can lead to plan disqualification and serious tax consequences for both
employer and plan participants, 10 5 these rules indirectly force an
100. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974).
101. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(1 1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (defining the conditions under which
joint and survivor annuities and pre-retirement survivor annuities are payable under a qualified
plan).
102. See I.R.C. § 417(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (defining the qualified joint and survivor
annuities under section 401 (a)(1 1)).
103. See I.R.C. § 417(a)(2) (1994) (requiring that an election to waive the joint and survivor
annuity be in writing, designate a beneficiary, and acknowledge the effect of the election).
104. Like all features of the qualification scheme, both the expense of compliance and risk of
noncompliance eventually fall on the sponsoring employer and thus discourage plan sponsorship.
105. See I.R.C. § 402(b)(4) (1994) (regarding the income tax consequences of a disqualifica-
tion to the plan participants); I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (1994) (regarding the sponsoring employer's pos-
sible loss or deferral of deductions for plan contributions). Further, the trust of a disqualified plan
would lose its tax exemption. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994) (providing qualified retirement trusts
with exemption from taxation).
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employer to involve itself in the social implications of its employees'
testamentary dispositions. This is arguably a concern for which a
business owner has neither time nor interest. Accordingly, a business
owner can personally provide for retirement income security in a way
that involves consideration of only the owner's testamentary desires by
avoiding implementation of a qualified retirement plan and directing
profits back into the business.
Qualified plans also interfere with the ability of an employee to
contract with an employer regarding the terms and conditions of
employment. Outside of qualified retirement arrangements, however,
an employer can offer "restricted property" to an employee willing to
suffer a forfeiture upon failing to achieve certain productivity or service
goals. 106 Forfeiture arrangements can benefit both employer and
employees by creating extraordinary rewards for sustained efforts
clearly defined prior to designated periods of service. For example, an
employer could compensate an employee with employer securities
endorsed with special restrictions that require a surrender of the
securities in the event the employee fails to provide continuous service
for a designated period, attain sales quotas, or increase revenues in a
unit of the business.
Contingent deferred compensation, however, must comply with
complex vesting standards when awarded in the context of a qualified
plan. 10 7  An employer cannot offer contributions or benefits under
qualified arrangements for any contingency except mere accrual of
service, and the periods of service required must conform with statutory
limitations. 10 8 These detailed standards present an employer with yet
another regulatory morass easily avoided by simply foregoing
sponsorship of a qualified retirement plan. Although the social
protection purpose implicit in the vesting rules might assist weak
employees from submitting to unreasonable compensatory
contingencies, it hinders employees who might willingly accept a wide
range of contingencies in order to obtain extraordinary compensatory
106. The tax consequences of employer-provided restricted property occur under I.R.C. § 83,
which generally precludes income recognition to the employee until any substantial risk of for-
feiture with respect to the property (usually stock in the employer) contractually disappears. See
I.R.C. § 83 (1994).
107. See generally I.R.C. § 411 (1994) (stating that in a qualified trust an employee's right to
benefits be nonforfeitable upon attainment of designated periods of service).
108. Section 411 allows employers to use any vesting schedule that fits within one of two
paradigms. One offers complete vesting on an all-or-nothing basis after five years of service and
the other mandates full vesting after seven years with partial vesting in earlier years. See I.R.C. §
41 l(a)(2) (1994).
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advantages in the future. 10 9 Furthermore, even weaker employees fail to
benefit if qualification complexities and restrictions cause large
numbers of employers to shun formal deferred compensation
arrangements.
Another socially-motivated qualification feature interferes with a
participant's freedom to contract with creditors. A set of nonalienation
rules effectively create a spendthrift trust for qualified plans."1
0
Ostensibly, the nonalienation qualification requirement saves plan
officials from dealing with demands against the retirement fund asserted
by creditors of participants. To the extent the nonalienation restriction
applies, the policy implications of protecting participants against their
own spendthrift tendencies in order to better preserve retirement income
security comport well with the employer's convenience in providing
unimpeded plan administration.11' The spendthrift principle, however,
does not uniformly apply to all creditors. Certain exceptions to the
nonalienation rule can cause considerable complexity in plan
administration. 112  One difficult exception invokes a set of ancillary
rules pertaining to "qualified domestic relations orders," which can
force plan officials to turn over all or a portion of a participant's accrued
benefit to a former spouse. 113 A plan official presented with a domestic
relations payment order must first check to verify that the order indeed
fulfills the technical criteria that make it "qualified." ' 14  Because the
order, even if qualified, cannot alter the timing or form of distributions
from the plan, 115 the trustee and plan administrator must place the order
109. For example, vesting outside the qualified plan might occur upon reaching certain pro-
ductivity goals, educational standards, or skills development. Section 411 permits forfeitures of
accrued benefits only for failure to attain requisite service time. See I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(1) (1994).
110. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1994). A spendthrift trust prohibits most creditors from receiv-
ing any benefit.
111. Presumably, plan administrators enjoy their ability to ignore attachment orders from local
courts, even though an inadvertent, ministerial observance of such an order might threaten a
plan's qualification and create a claim to restore the portion of an accrued benefit paid under the
order.
112. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (1994) (permitting voluntary assignments of up to 10% of any
benefit payment made to a plan participant). The Treasury regulations also permit enforcement of
federal tax obligations against a participant's accrued benefit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-
13(b)(2) (as amended in 1988); see also I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(C) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (re-
garding enforcement relating to judgments from a crime involving the plan).
113. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B) (1994) (allowing alienation pursuant to a qualified domestic rela-
tions order).
114. See I.R.C. § 414(p) (1994) (defining a qualified domestic order as an order that "creates
or recognizes the existence of an alternative payee's rights to, or assigns an alternative payee the
right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a
plan").
115. See I.R.C. § 414(p)(3 ) (1994) (restricting the order to the amount, form, and payee that
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into the plan's institutional memory for later execution and keep track
of the alternate payee for the time remaining until permitted
distributions occur. 11
6
The various rules implementing social policies for qualified plans do
not endear prospective plan sponsors to formal retirement savings
arrangements.1 17 These rules at the very least create additional agency
costs for employers.'18 At worse, inadvertent violations of these
voluminous and complex edicts can jeopardize the very retirement
income security goals the qualification scheme presumably supports
because adverse tax deficiencies resulting from a disqualification,
including interest and penalties, can devastate both employers and
participating employees. 19 The more the regulatory scheme attempts to
force employers to protect employees, the greater the disincentive for
employers to adopt qualified retirement plans. Because many
employers exercise their unrestricted choice to avoid these plans
altogether, millions of American workers have no access to substantial
retirement savings arrangements. 12
0
A decision to forgo adoption of a qualified retirement arrangement in
no way precludes a business owner from personally providing for his
own retirement because enterprise reinvestment so frequently produces
wealth for the owner under tax-favored circumstances. Absent an
imprudent confiscation of business ownership interests under a new
wealth redistribution approach, the collective decisions of thousands of
has been previously determined by the plan).
116. Some kinds of qualified retirement plans can only make distributions upon the occur-
rence of certain events. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (referring to plans that desig-
nate death, disability, retirement or other separation of service as occurrences for distribution).
117. Nor do the seemingly nonsocial economic rules of the qualification scheme help popu-
larize qualified retirement plans among employers. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (1994) (prohibiting a
plan from taking into account the compensation of any employee above $160,000 per year).
Owners with annual compensation above $160,000 must structure their benefit or contribution
formula in a way that does not fully reflect their own compensation levels, thus either relatively
reducing their personal accrued benefits or increasing the plan costs with respect to other partici-
pants. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(17)(B) (1994) (establishing the original compensation cap at $150,000
per year with an allowance for cost of living increases).
118. A service industry has evolved to address the problems of qualified retirement plan ad-
ministration. This industry includes not only lawyers and accountants, but also actuaries, ap-
praisers, financial planners, insurance consultants, investment advisers, and teams of in-house and
independent professional administrators.
119. See supra note 105 (regarding the tax consequences of disqualification, including loss of
tax exempt status).
120. The employers who must adopt and maintain a qualified retirement arrangement do so
under contractual restraints, such as collective bargaining agreements. Of course, elements of
contractual freedom in the negotiation process suggest that even these employers have the ulti-
mate power to avoid qualified plans.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
privately controlled employers will continue to disfavor even modest
wealth accumulations for common workers. 121 Owners find business
reinvestment a beneficial way to fund their own retirements while
avoiding complex social purpose regulation, practical restrictions on
access to capital, and forced coverage and funding associated with
qualified retirement savings programs.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE DE FACTO RETIREMENT SCHEME FOR
SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS AND A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Under current law, small business owners have superior prerogatives
for enhancing their personal retirement security. Their employees,
however, cannot attain substantial tax-favored retirement savings
without the cooperation of the owners. Rather than reducing the
choices of employers, Congress could best narrow the retirement
savings gap by giving employees new opportunities to fund individual
retirement accounts on their own.
A. Altering the Advantages of Business Reinvestment Would Not Solve
the Problem of Retirement Savings Availability
If reinvestment by small business owners did not result in significant
tax advantages, entrepreneurs might find the tax advantages of qualified
retirement plans much more attractive by comparison. More business
owners would turn to qualified plans in order to provide efficiently for
their own retirements and obtain immediate tax relief through
contribution deductions 122 and income recognition avoidance. 123  This
option, however, has serious drawbacks.
To make business reinvestment relatively inefficient, Congress would
have to remove substantial tax advantages, such as the capital gains rate
preference, 124 the lower corporate rate brackets that comparatively
shelter modest earnings accumulations in closely held corporations, 125
121. Even die-hard proponents of wealth confiscation understand some of the practical limita-
tions of "killing the goose that lays the golden eggs." Wealth confiscation attempts can cause an
exodus of talent and resources that ultimately destabilizes an economy.
122. See generally I.R.C. § 404 (1994) (limiting deductions for contributions paid by an em-
ployer under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing or annuity plan).
123. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994) (allowing an exemption from taxation for qualified retirement
trusts); I.R.C. § 402(a) (1994) (providing for the taxation of any amount distributed to the distrib-
utee from a tax-exempt qualified retirement trust).
124. See I.R.C. § I(h) (West Supp. 1999) (setting forth preferential rates for capital gains).
125. See I.R.C. § 11 (1994). Note that under section 11 (b)(2), the advantage of the lower cor-
porate rate brackets does not extend to certain personal service corporations. See I.R.C. §
I l(b)(2) (1994).
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the broad deductibility of business expenditures, 126 and the stepped-up
basis rule that eliminates latent gain on a business interest held until the
owner's death. 127 Historically, these tax features have been enhanced,
not restricted or abolished. 128 Therefore, unless the forces that promote
tax advantages for businesses somehow weaken significantly in coming
years, the tax advantages associated with business reinvestment likely
will remain intact.
Political power alone does not account for the continued popularity of
tax advantages for business reinvestment. These advantages arguably
contribute to the strength of the general economy, particularly in its
capacity to sustain appropriately high levels of employment.
129
Accordingly, policy makers must consider whether opposition to tax
advantages for small businesses might cause more harm than good.
130
To promote retirement income security for workers who do not own
businesses, labor advocates, who oppose tax advantages favoring
business reinvestment, must act carefully. If they assert that removing
tax incentives for business reinvestment would encourage business
owners to sponsor qualified plans, these labor advocates might
inadvertently stifle employment opportunities. Diverting direct
investment in small businesses to indirect investment in publicly traded
securities held in qualified retirement plans could reduce hiring in small
businesses while further energizing securities markets that probably do
not need additional artificial growth incentives.
131
126. Congress would have to amend provisions of the Internal Revenue Code like sections
162, 168, and 179 to make them much more restrictive. See I.R.C. § 162 (1994) (allowing a de-
duction for all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness); I.R.C. § 168 (1994) (permitting depreciation deductions for tangible property); I.R.C. § 179
(1994) (allowing immediate deductions for depreciable business assets). Any such limiting
mechanisms would likely add complexity to the Code, invite loophole explorations, and intensify
lobbying for a reversal of policy.
127. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(l) (1994) (defining the basis of assets received from a decedent as
the fair market value at the date of the decedent's death).
128. Note that the allowance for "bonus depreciation" under section 179(b)(I) increases
steadily through the year 2003. See I.R.C. § 179(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
129. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (supporting the argument that reinvestment
boosts employment rates and the economy in general).
130. By the late 1990s, many European countries, which generally impose higher levels of
taxation and regulation on businesses than does the United States, struggled with high unem-
ployment levels while the U.S. economy enjoyed historically low unemployment rates.
131. One nonartificial growth factor affecting the stock market boom of the late 1990s re-
sulted from the economic maturation of the "baby boom" generation (born between 1946 and
1964), who invested huge amounts of wealth in domestic securities.
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In addition to shifting capital from direct business investment to
publicly traded securities, 132 shutting down tax advantages for business
reinvestment might produce at least two kinds of adverse reactions from
business owners. First, employers and their advisers would want to
vigorously probe existing technical possibilities for reducing qualified
plan contribution and coverage costs respecting nonhighly compensated
employees. 133  Second, employers would just as vigorously push for
new legislation altering the qualified plans scheme to expand benefits
for owners and other highly compensated employees while restricting
costs attributable to rank and file employees.1 34 The net effect of these
adverse reactions would not advance the retirement income security
needs of workers who have no control over the businesses that employ
them. Qualified plans would continue to become increasingly complex,
and small employers would still resist implementing retirement savings
devices that require substantial additional costs not corresponding with
increased productivity or expanded business opportunities. 135
B. Altering the Qualified Plan's Scheme to Allow All Employees to
Establish and Fund Their Own Comparable Arrangements Would Best
Promote Retirement Savings Access
Although destroying tax incentives for business owners to reinvest in
their businesses would likely produce hardships for both employers and
employees, simply shifting the power to implement substantial tax-
favored retirement arrangements from employers to employees would
benefit both groups. If Congress removed the $2000 limitation on
annual contributions to individual retirement accounts, any employee
132. Outside of stock purchases under initial public offerings, capital invested in stocks usu-
ally only transfers value between buyers and sellers of such investments who have no substantial
say in company management. Owner investment of capital in closely held businesses involves
economic transfers that directly stimulate business activity under the guidance of those who most
intimately understand the efficient applications of such capital. A very important policy question
is whether the taxation scheme should stimulate the former kind of capital transfers (represented
by qualified retirement plan portfolios) while discouraging the latter capital transfers, which di-
rectly stimulate the growth of small businesses.
133. The easiest way to do this might involve outsourcing labor (perhaps to foreign countries)
or getting rid of regular employees in favor of temporary employees and independent contractors.
134. For example, employers might push to broaden the participation exclusions available
under section 410. See I.R.C. § 410 (1994) (providing minimum participation standards).
135. The nondiscrimination concept expressed in I.R.C. sections 401(a)(4) and 410(b) only
distinguishes broad categories of employees depending on whether they have "highly compen-
sated employee" status. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994); I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994). Thus, the qualifi-
cation scheme does not directly permit an employer to match deferred compensation awards with
the efforts, skills, knowledge, and productivity of individual workers in a workforce. See supra
notes 94-99 and accompanying text (arguing that direct compensatory incentives are more effi-
cient than costly retirement plans).
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desiring substantial retirement savings could freely effect income
recognition deferrals without the necessity of an employer-sponsored
plan. 136 Abolishing all restrictions on the deductibility of contributions
to individual retirement accounts would also help. 137 Employees would
have unfettered access to tax-favored retirement income security, and
employers would no longer need to assume paternalistic and costly
control over their employees' retirement savings prospects.
Altering the current qualified plans scheme in this manner would
create the equivalent of a universal "cash or deferred" arrangement-a
nationally sponsored "401(k)" plan. 138 Employees working in the
majority of small businesses that sponsor no qualified plan would not
have to forgo serious retirement planning simply because their
employers decide that qualified plans offer too few advantages to justify
the bother and costs. Like business owners themselves, common
employees would have an attractive tax-favored choice for fulfilling
their retirement planning goals without the inconvenience of having to
account for the retirement planning circumstances of others. A business
owner could create personal retirement security through expansion of
the enterprise that produces the owner's current livelihood. Likewise,
under an expanded individual retirement account program, any worker
could, while saving taxes, transform a substantial portion of current
income into additional security for the future. Neither business owners
nor common workers would have to worry about the retirement needs of
fellow workers, cost elements beyond their control, or the numerous
complications of an overregulated retirement scheme. 139
Although many rank and file workers whose employers offer no
qualified plans do not take advantage of their ability to fund an
individual retirement account even to the parsimonious extent currently
permitted, all workers could potentially benefit from an expansion of
self-funding retirement options. Any worker can experience economic
changes over a career that warrant at least temporary funding of a tax-
136. See I.R.C. § 408(a) (1994) (defining an individual retirement account as "a trust created
or organized in the United States for the exclusive benefit of an individual or his beneficiaries").
137. See I.R.C. § 219(g) (1994) (limiting individual retirement account deductions for indi-
viduals participating in pension plans).
138. This suggests that the contribution limit for individual retirement accounts should rise
from $2000 to at least the statutory limit for elective deferrals under section 401(k) plans con-
tained in section 402(g)(1). See I.R.C. § 402(g)(1) (1994). Currently, this limit sets the maxi-
mum elective deferral per participant per year at $10,000. See I.R.S. Notice 97-58, 1997-2 C.B.
309.
139. Compare I.R.C. § 408 (1994) (regulating individual retirement accounts), with I.R.C. §
401(a) (1994) (including all Code sections incorporated by reference within the latter, underscor-
ing the relative simplicity of I.R.C. § 408).
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favored retirement plan. 140  These changes include improved
compensation, economic emancipation from obligations to support
children as they grow older, marriage to a spouse who has assets or
potential earning capacity, eventual payment of long-term debts, and
serendipitous relief from financial need. 14 1  Even if ultimately
unexercised by many workers, the opportunity to effect tax-favored
retirement savings beyond a mere $2000 per year 142 without reliance on
the good graces of a sponsoring employer would enhance the financial
planning prospects of the entire national workforce.143
Concerns that highly compensated employees would take undue
advantage of a universal program that permitted substantial, self-
actuated retirement contributions need not deprive the rest of the
workforce of their personal opportunities to provide for future income
security. Congress could always control the revenue leak from an
expansion of self-funding opportunities by phasing in lower dollar
limitations on individual retirement account contributions when an
employee's income exceeds a designated amount or an employee
already receives substantial retirement funding from an employer.
Additionally, business owners themselves would not necessarily take
full advantage of expanded, self-funding opportunities because
reinvestment in one's own business often provides more attractive
economic prospects, and sometimes even better tax benefits, than
investing in qualified retirement plans. If freed from the regulatory
burden of qualified plans, many business owners likely would still
prefer to plough all earnings not needed for current consumption back
into the enterprise that serves simultaneously as a source of current
income and as a retirement nest egg.144
140. Expanded opportunities for funding individual retirement accounts would work best if
Congress would also amend section 408 by including a "catch up" provision that permits even
greater contributions for workers who do not commence retirement savings until later in life.
141. Serendipitous financial relief can come in many forms, including an inheritance, unan-
ticipated increases in the value of a home, or an unexpected promotion at work.
142. In 1974, when section 408 appeared, Congress set the contribution limit for individual
retirement accounts at $1500 per year. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002, 88 Stat. 829, 959 (1974) (codified at I.R.C. § 220).
143. Psychologically, expanded retirement savings opportunities for all could lead to greater
participation because those who do start saving for the future tend to add new life to a workplace
culture. For instance, once an employer implements a section 401(k) plan, those who initially
make elective deferrals pique the interests of those who initially do not by mentioning their ac-
count balances, talking about their investment choices, and making known their retirement plans
or wishes.
144. As developed throughout this Article, the business owner reaps personal tax benefits by
either reinvesting in the business or by contributing to a qualified retirement plan. Consequently,
business owner participation in an expanded individual retirement account scheme should pro-
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The category of highly compensated employees includes better paid
employees who do not own or control their employers. 145 Many highly
compensated employees work for larger employers that sponsor
qualified retirement plans already permitting substantial retirement
savings.' 4 6 Many other managerial and professional employees do not
fare so well. No sound policy reason exists to prevent any highly
compensated employee working for a nonsponsoring employer from
having a basic choice to create substantial tax advantaged retirement
savings. Access to universal retirement savings makes sense for all
workers. Encouragement of personal retirement savings without
artificial distinctions based on earnings would increase the national
savings rate, create a climate of personal financial responsibility, and
free all employees from the adverse consequences of their employers'
decisions not to sponsor formal retirement savings arrangements. 
147
V. CONCLUSION
A business owner's first impulse upon discovering that enterprise
operations have produced profits in excess of what the owner needs for
personal consumption often leads to a decision to retain excess earnings
within the business that produced them. Given the complexities, social
edicts, and open-ended costs associated with qualified retirement
plans,' 48 business owners frequently give formal retirement plan
contributions a low priority and sometimes even prefer personal
consumption as a better use for excess earnings. The preference for
business reinvestment becomes even more compelling when business
duce relatively neutral overall tax effects.
145. See I.R.C. § 414(q)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (defining a highly compensated em-
ployee as any employee who was a five percent owner or had compensation in excess of
$80,000). Many employees earning more than $80,000 per year have no ownership interest in
their employers.
146. An expanded individual retirement account scheme need not include all workers. Those
who already receive substantial benefits from a qualified retirement plan could have their annual
individual retirement account limitation reduced dollar-for-dollar, down to the current limitation
of $2000 under section 408(a), by amounts contributed from time to time on their behalf under
section 401 (a) arrangements.
147. If an expanded individual retirement account scheme based on section 401(k) plan con-
tribution limitations appeared too costly from a tax revenue viewpoint, Congress could set the
precise limitation on annual contributions downward for both individual retirement accounts and
other qualified plans until the revenue leakage from all tax-favored retirement savings vehicles
reached a point of fiscal and political tolerance.
148. Expanding workforces tend to make qualified retirement plan costs open-ended due to
the participation coverage edicts of section 410. See I.R.C. § 410 (1994) (specifying the mini-
mum participation standards necessary to constitute a qualified trust).
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owners and their advisers contemplate the many federal income taxation
benefits associated with reinvestment.
These tax benefits include immediate deductibility of many business
expenditures 149 and long-term capital gains rate preferences, which
compare quite favorably with the tax benefits resulting from
sponsorship of a qualified retirement plan. 150  More pointedly,
enterprise reinvestment allows entrepreneurs to enjoy these tax benefits
while providing personally for their own retirements by adding
economic value to their growing concerns rather than enhancing
potential accrued benefits in a qualified retirement arrangement.' 5 '
Reinvestment in the enterprise competes all too well with
contributions to formal retirement plans. Tax benefits, value growth,
and freedom from superfluous costs and excess regulation make
business reinvestment attractive enough to cause a large majority of
small business owners to avoid tax-favored retirement savings
arrangements. Many small employers refuse to sponsor qualified
retirement plans simply because they offer insufficient benefits
compared to business reinvestment. These owners prefer reinvestment
strategies that yield relatively little regulatory interference and
substantial direct personal control. 152
Because removing the tax benefits of business reinvestment would
likely produce too great an overall economic detriment while producing
tremendous political resistance, the best approach for solving the lack of
access to retirement savings for employees in small enterprises requires
changing the current retirement savings structure to permit employees to
assume direct plan sponsorship power. By expanding every employee's
possibilities for deferring compensation into self-settled, tax-favored
149. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the similar tax effect the conver-
sion of retained revenues into business expenditures will have compared with making contribu-
tions to retirement plans).
150. The comparison between tax benefits for business reinvestment and qualified retirement
plans suggests that legislative policy has somewhat equally encouraged both retirement income
security and the employment/business growth enhancements necessary to provide for American
workers until they retire.
151. Most importantly regarding personal funding for retirement income security, a business
owner who uses reinvestment of profits to promote growth of the enterprise experiences no limi-
tations on contributions or benefits similar to those imposed under sections 415(b) and (c) for
qualified retirement plans. See I.R.C. § 415(b) (1994) (limiting annual benefits); I.R.C. § 415(c)
(1994) (limiting contributions).
152. Reinvesting profits to add value to the business not only offers a good retirement ap-
proach for the owner, but also affords more efficient compensation planning for the entire
workforce. Compensation expense directed toward qualified retirement plans is steered ineffi-
ciently. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (arguing that the qualification scheme does
not allow employers to match the efforts of workers).
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accounts, common workers would have choices for retirement savings
closer to those now enjoyed only by business owners.
The current tax climate that allows business reinvestment to serve as
a de facto retirement plan for owners explains why eighty percent of
small business employees have no coverage under employer sponsored
retirement plans. 153 To correct this problem, Congress should dissolve
the marriage between access to substantial retirement savings and the
unrestrained prerogative of employers. Serious tax-favored retirement
savings should not come from on high but should result, if at all, from
the prerogative of those who would voluntarily seek to enhance their
retirements beyond the provisions of the Social Security system.
153. See supra note 1 (explaining that 50 million Americans have no coverage, only eight
percent of low wage earners have coverage, and only 20% of small business workers have retire-
ment plans).
